A paramilitary soldier injured in Saturday’s gun battle with Maoist rebels is admitted to a hospital in Raipur, India, Sunday, April 4, 2021.
Credit: Photo AP
On April 3, 22 police and paramilitary personnel were killed and 30 others were injured in one The Maoist ambush in Sukma district in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh. The deadliest Maoist attack – the Marxist-Leninist rebels endorsed by Mao Zedong – in four years, the attack in Sukma came just ten days after rebels blow up a bus carrying security staff in the Narayanpur district, also in Bastar.
The military ambush happened mid-one Great operation, many forces was initiated by security forces on the night of 2 April to capture Hidma, the commander of his fearsome 1st Battalion on Maoist faction.
But the operation did not go as planned.
One of the teams was met with a Maoist ambush. Far outnumbered and overwhelmed by the Maoists, the entrenched team suffered heavy casualties.
A rich, mineral-rich jungle region, the Bastar in southern Chhattisgarh is home to “some the poorest – adivasis [tribals] prevail in this field. ” Around 50-60 percent of families in Bastar live below the poverty line compared with the national average of 22 percent. On most health and socioeconomic indicators, Bastar performed poorly.
Its mineral wealth has attracted private and government investment and several mining companies are active in Chhattisgarh. However, this has cost rivals a heavy price for them to lose their traditional land, livelihoods, and way of life. It was among these deprived adivasi communities that India’s Maoist rebels found recruits, shelter and support.
The Maoist uprising had faded and weakened for decades. The current period, which began in 2004 when several Maoist groups rallied to form the Indo-Maoist Communist Party (CPI-Maoist), has seen unprecedented violence and casualties.
Better coordinated and well-coordinated anti-insurgency activities led to the extermination of hundreds of Maoist leaders and cadres. In recent years, there has been one refuse on the number of Maoist attacks nationwide as well as in the geographic area under their influence.
And while there was one reduce the number of attacks In Chhattisgarh too, Mao’s grip on Bastar remains strong.
Bastar’s jungle terrain, meager roads and communications networks, the failure of state development initiatives to get into the pockets of Maoism, and the reluctance of the scene Local scrutiny in carrying out anti-Maoist activities has been considered among main reason because of Maoism’s grip on Bastar.
In Bastar, Maoists have repeatedly shown their ability to surpass and defeat security forces. Last March, they ambushed security staff in Minpa in Sukma district. Security forces have an advantage in numbers; there are 600 policemen compared to only 250 Maoists. However, it later managed to remove 17 security personnel.
In most of the major attacks south of Bastar, security forces fell into a trap set by the Maoists. At Minpa last year, police officials apparently received intelligence that the Maoists were planning. a great meeting in Elmagunda area. The teams from many paramilitary forces were dispatched and eventually entered a Maoist ambush.
The Maoist ambush on 3 April was the result of later acting on flawed intelligence regarding Hidma’s presence in the area. As at Minpa last year, this time at Tekulugudam in Sukma district, the Maoists were Waiting and kill the army in the gun battle that follows.
It is clear that the state’s intelligence gathering in Bastar continues to be weak and Maoists are exploiting this by providing the security forces with bogus intelligence and Take them into carefully placed traps.
Although popular support for the Maoists has declined over the years, neither the security forces nor the local government have won the confidence of the local people. This has hindered the gathering of intelligence in Bastar.
Importantly, India’s security facility may need to rethink the major activities it launched against the Maoists. The campaign it launched against Hidma territory involved about 2,000 troops. As one security facility official pointed out, “When there are massive troop movements, during a major operation, high-ranking officers fly in and out of Bijapur and Sukma, moving between camps will happening. It is so real difficult to move be kept silent. “
Such operations alerted the rebels of an upcoming operation and prompted them to set up ambushes. Security officials said it was necessary to fight the Maoist faction, “are small teams that attack based on solid human intelligence.”
Immediately after the attack in Sukma, Indian Interior Minister Amit Shah announced that activities against the Maoist faction would be intensified. However, a “works greatWas launched at Chhattisgarh.
But fighting the nimble Maoists requires small teams of nimble warriors, rather than a stubborn elephant and sneaking its head into a trap.