Over the past decade, the Eastern Partners still struggle with a lack of knowledge of Europe’s Russian-centered framework and stance. Meanwhile, the standoff in the Eastern Partner countries causes discontent, creates instability, and ignites populist impulses.
The EU’s East Partnership Policy (EaP) is like a handwritten Rorschach paper. Depending on who observes it, it completely changes form and meaning. Seen from Warsaw or Vilnius, it is a project of great economic, strategic and civilian importance; For the Italians, the French, the Dutch, and many other Western European countries, it was just a vague program that had not been outlined and its purpose was not well understood.
In the media, little has been said about the European Partnership Agreement and when it is implemented, above all from a coherent, never-European national point of view. Indeed, it is very likely that even political leaders are not very familiar with the EaP framework.
A similar argument can be made with regard to partnership countries. Thanks to the geographic contiguity or parallels of historical experience, Central and Eastern European countries are familiar with events in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
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Patchy knowledge of the states of the former Soviet Union
In Western Europe, by contrast, there is often a patchwork of former Soviet states, projected into an indeterminate geographical and political space dominated by Russia or directly mistaken for Russia, borders and interests of this country.
As a result, most Western European countries believe that matters concerning the members of the Eastern Partnership should be negotiated with Moscow rather than with the local authorities, not to mention the partnership itself.
This attitude has become even more apparent with the recent crises in Nagorno-Karabakh and Belarus, where the EU countries hardly ever refer to the Eastern Partnership as a viable vehicle for …