Chinese State Commissioner and Public Security Minister Zhao Kezhi phoned Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on October 23, 2018.
Credit: Prime Minister Office of India
Zhao Kezhi enjoyed an accidental escape over the gauntlet of a minor political purge at the end of the first Xi administration in 2016. As Minister of Public Security, Zhao is currently the head. An internal security apparatus was bolstered for the second purge before a third Xi term could occur. But Zhao’s legacy will not be a personal luck and a happy career. His legacy will shape the domestic security apparatus for the period 2022-2032.
Looking at the 2022 Party Congress, the promotion of personnel to the Political and Legal Committee is in a strange place. Zhao should naturally move up to replace Guo Shengkun as the committee’s secretary, but by Party age regulations both Guo and Zhao will retire in 2022That means both political commissar and public security minister should be filled. Clerk of political and legal affairs is a Politburo mandate, while the Minister of Public Security, as the Deputy Minister of Internal Security, is not. The former political and legal affairs secretary was the position of the Standing Politburo, but that tradition was changed after the Zhou Yongkang affair. At this distance from October 2022, Chen Yixin seems to be the first to take over the secretary position. But whoever replaces Zhao Kezhi will be the front line of stability for the first half of the decade, where both Xinjiang and cybersecurity have been key policy positions.
Zhao was only 19 years old when he started as a middle school teacher in 1973, showing his family’s protection from the Cultural Revolution. Early education must be avoided for low-level positions in the Party. Zhao then attended the Central Party School’s essential graduate training, which was essentially the precursor to higher administrative promotion. Zhao’s career far outstripped his original potential, mostly confined to his hometown of Shandong from 1973 to 2010. He didn’t do the typical usual duty tour. of a teenage soccer team is prepared for national leadership. After being in Shandong, Zhao was challenged with advancement to leadership positions in the CCP in neighboring Jiangsu, continuing in the position of party leader instead of state, showing a fascinating change. in the promotion model under Mr. Xi.
Zhao’s great career came after just two years in Jiangsu, first as acting governor and then as governor of Guizhou Province. Guizhou has traditionally been the testing ground for policy, too poor for no one to care if the policies fail. China’s top economists have worked extensively in regional policy trials to first reduce poverty and overcome it is difficult to integrate it with a coastal industrial growth model, and then the development of innovative industries and science and technology and, most recently, an ambitious plan to integrate Guizhou’s economy into Chongqing-Singapore spatial planning.
While the current Politburo leadership is considered the New Army of Zhijiang, for those top or near the highest level of the CCP that somehow touched Zhejiang province, a newer group of Xi loyalists who emerged through Guizhou. Nearly similar to the Chongqing model, but under the stricter central command of Bo Xilai, this Guizhou gang is a test site for some of China’s current elite leaders including the rising stars. to Chen Yixin and Chen Gang, as well as Li Zhanshu and Chen Min. Oh. Current Political and Legal Committee secretary Guo Shengkun was also the deputy secretary of neighboring Guangxi province for 4 years and the secretary of Guangxi for 5 years, before moving to the central level to be secretary and ministry. police chief.
In Guizhou, Zhao oversaw the development of a new political group and was the pivotal point in China’s new model of national development. With Zhao’s leadership, Guizhou has grown from an orphaned backward economy from a coastal growth experience to a new one. The third front industrial technology center. Guizhou has been developed into an engineering-industrial command economy to cover China’s accelerating global technology competition, trade war, and technology self-sufficiency. The The failed venture with chipmaker Qualcomm is considered as the pioneer team to transfer high technology to the region. The massive infrastructure construction in internet hardware paved the way for the state to develop a cloud computing and artificial intelligence hub in Guizhou, to complement existing satellite technologies and expansion as well as the development of high-tech production centers.
Between Guizhou’s leadership and his current position as Minister of Public Security, Zhao was the party secretary of the Hebei Party Committee, promoted in 2015 to replace Chu Benshun, who was purged during the anti-corruption campaign. In Hebei, China’s traditional steel hub and the core of Jingjinji’s new public administration integration, Zhao held onto the ship. Zhao was commended for his loyalty in the 19th Party Congress with his one-term promotion to a state council member and police minister. The industrial-technical flow developed in Guizhou and Hebei will follow current Minister Zhao to an unlikely geographic region: Central Asia through the institutional export of internal surveillance regime.
Zhao is an indispensable ally recently by the Chinese Coast Guard and the People’s Armed Police returned under the leadership of the Central Military Commission (and Xi Jinping’s). Zhao is second in the field of wise and agreeable commanding. After 2022, the new Minister of Public Security, as Deputy Minister of the Political and Legal Committee, will have a much larger policy mandate than Guo Shengkun under Meng Jianzhu or Zhao himself under Guo. .
During the past five years, under Guo Shengkun, Zhao was the second in charge of the domestic security apparatus, the apparatus increasingly strengthened in the country and planned to be deployed in the country. near foreign countries Belt and Road states. While China’s near-Pacific neighbors analyzed the Coast Guard Law calculations for East China and South China Sea theaters, the analyzes much less focused on the involvement of the Commission. Political and Legal issues with and transfer of domestic surveillance status to Central Asia. and Eurasian Belt and Road countries. Political and Legal Issues 2022-2027 and the Ministry of Public Security leadership taken over by Zhao will continue to develop this international integration of national security and national security near foreign countries with domestic security mandate. expanded.